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(c) Development over time, the supply, side. 
On the supply we shall be interested in- the changing quantity and 
quality of input supplies , the productivity of such inputs, the 
development of domestic inter-industry relationships, and the changiii 
role of imported supplies. There will be a second area of interest -
the product specialization of the econoiaies and its responsiveness 
to price effects and to public policy tools. 
This paper presents the preliminary work on part (a) -
The structure of the Kenya Economy 1957-. • •' 1 
Eventually a study will be developed of inter-industry relationship for 
the East African economy for 1957, 1961 & 1963. To provide some idea of the 
method and of the structure of the Kenya economy some preliminary results on 
the structure of the Kenyan, economy in* 1957 are set out here. •• • 
Table 1 represents the first step towards an input-output table' for the 
Kenyan economy. It.is incomplete in a number of respects.'* The agricultural 
sector should be shown in a much finer breakdown and its inputs, as yet 
mallocS-ted, will'be identifiable with the aid of the Kenya agricultural 
surveys. For identified and subdivided between various categories of imports, 
although some part is also •unidentified domestically produced inputs and 
a small proportion represents various services purchased by the industries 
concerned but not identified in detail in the Survey of Industry data on which 
the table is partly based. 
The table when completed will" also include a" section showing the end uses 
of the gross domestic product plus imports. 
Also, the data on distribution on which column 19 is partly based is 
surely suspect, and can be improved with the help of the 1960 Survey of 
Distribution.. . _ '•• 
The preliminary nature of the table having been accepted, what does its 
broad outline, probably a correct picture, tell us? In practise a similar 
table for 1963 will be for more useful for planning'purposes' but the exercise 
of examining this table for 1957 will illustrate the"method. 
In the table, 21 sectors are.identified as sources of gross domestic 
product, including one large catch-all category for distribution, rent, 
services and utilities. Of these, direct primary production .involves 1-3, 
manufacturing in one form or another 4-17, construction 18, transport 19, 
the forementioned catch-all category 20 and government 21. 
The value added constribution of each of these groups is shown in table 2 
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In the remaining eight industries three can be identified as potentially 
of considerable "forward "arid backward linkage - "maS5iJaeiy""a[na' repairs," transport 
equipment and repairs and metal products. ¥ith the first two the emphasis -
was on repairs using imported materials, with some body-building-activities. 
In all three cases the backward linkage was almost entirely 'to the foreign-
sector. The limit on the development of this type of activity is basically 
twofold - the' availability of technology and the limited industrialization 
of the economies. These are industries which live off of the growth of other 
industries, a mechanized agriculture, or a substantial consumer durables 
market. These 'three industries contributed £5,100 thousand valued added 
to gross donestIc'product. 
Two industries which form: links between the primary producer and other 
industries are timber and leather; the second is quite "insignificant. The" 
first is a relatively large industry of simple technology' composed predominantly 
of a large group of medium size establishments (i.e. over QOfa cf "employees 
are in establishments with 50 or more employees). 
The remaining two industries of importance are chemicals and non-metallic 
mineral products (mainly building materials). Chemicals consists, cf. 
a consolidation of three seperate industries - the most important being the 
basic chemical.industry, responsible for two thirds of gross output, mainly 
soda ash and wattle extract. This industry thus contains an element cf.. 
primary activity. The second important element was soap production for 
East African consumption, based on local materials. The third element is 
a miscellaneous category of chemical products - pharmaceuticals, 
insecticides (including pyrethrum processing) and paints. The chemicals 
industry is thus primarily based on the local primary res ources, producing 
for the export market, and secondarily the production of consumer goods for 
the domestic market, based on local materials. The non-metallic mineral 
products industry primarily produced inputs for the domestic construction 
industry and as with chemicals,- because- of the- integrated nature of the 
structure, includes an element of primary production.- • . , • ! 
To summarize regarding the inter-industxy relationships, the construction 
industry proved particularly important in providing backward linkages both 
because of its "large size relative to the economy during this period and 
because of the bulky nature and straightforward technical character of its 
inputs. Textiles and clothing have potentially good backward linkage and 
room for general expansion; this proposition hats been confirmed by subsequent -
developments. Similarly from this table there 'was evidence of the possibility 
of an expanding paper-pulp industry. The combined Imports of chemicals, 
machinery- and equipment and metal products cf" about £30 million is an 
Indication both of limited nature of the existing industrial development and 
the difficulties of further progress; these categories contain many items of 
high technical corplexity,"'' some where the economies of scale will render the 
domestic market insufficient to support a' local Industry and, together, 
they form a group with cDuplicated interrelationships and potential economies 
external to the plant hut internal to the group as a whole; also their output 
must form the basis of industrialization efforts. 
Prom the point of view of development planning two interesting conclusions 
may be drawn. Construction activities, the basis of social overhead development 
and of urban development, could be undertaken with relatively small direct 
impact on the inport bill, whereas, investment in machinery and equipment, the 
basis of industrialization, would be to a very substantial degree reflected 
in the imports bill. The corollary of this conclusion is that the multiplier 
effect on domestic activity of construction activity would be much agreater 
than that of investment in machinery and equipment. If the baaic constraint 
on the development programme Is the availability of foreign exchange then 
construction will be more practicable than investment in machinery and 
equipment. On the other hand if the basic constraint is the pressure on 
domestic capacity then construction activity is less practicable. 
NOTES ON THE TABLE 
The basic sources of data used in compiling this table were the 
Kenya Survey of Industrial Production; 1957, Domestic Income and 
Product in Kenya: A description of Sources and Methods with 
Revised Calculations from 1954 to 1958, and the Annual Trade 
Report, 1957. 
The sum of the net output row is equal to gross domestic product 
for 1957 at factor cost. 
The unallocated inputs are mainly services and imported Inputs 
not domestically produced. The large item under agriculture will 
be partly allocated In a subsequent version of the table with the 
aid of the agricultural survey for Kenya. The large unallocated 
item under construction includes about £4 million of structural 
steel. 
Imports are net home consumption plus duties. They are allocated 
between industries roughly according to whether they would be 
outputs of those industries, if produced domestically. 
A gap which will be remedied in a subsequent version is 
caused by the non-inclusion of interterritorial trade. This will 
be much more important when a final uses section is added to the 
table. 
Inports of drink are shown net of duty payments. 
The section "Miscellaneous including Tobacco" should be numbered 
as the 17th. Sector in the table. 
-SDHEJJ2 
P. G. Clark-
4.12.63. 
MEET STEPS FOR I1©USTRIALIZATI0N IN EAST AFRICA* 
1. Industrialization policy is simultaneously the greatest present 
source- of economic•.tension, within the East African common market, and the 
greatest potential source of economic gain from closer East African in-
tegration. It is of more than,.passfi.ng interest to consider, therefore,, 
what are the most constructive and economically feasible next steps in 
industrialization policy, to limit the risks of disruption of the common 
market and to seize as much as possible of the potential economic gain. 
If full political federation is delayed or indefinitely postponed, these 
next steps should make the common market much more attractive and viable. 
If agreement on full political federation is reached promptly, they 
should-.provide the basis for assumption of federal responsibility. Thus 
both, optimises and pessimists about federation might find common ground 
in these next steps. 
2, The purpose of this brief paper is simply to present some specific 
ideas about next steps in industrialization policy, as a stimulus to 
further thought. I have been stimulated myself by the -papers and dis-
cussion at the Conference on East African Federation, sponsored by the 
University of. East Africa, in Nairobi, November 26-30, 1963. 
: 3.. Industrialization policy in East Africa should be aimed not at one, 
but at two, objectives. These twin objectives are (a.) to raise drama-
tically the total rate of industrial investment in East.Africa, and 
(b) to ensure that future industrial investment is geographically dis-
tributed so that its benefits are divided approximately equally among 
Kenya,! Uganda, an<3- Tanganyika. It is essential to set the first objec-
tive because present industrialization is quite limited (about 100,000 
employees in maniafacturing), because the rate of growth of manufacture''""'" 
ing has been unhappily slow (gross product about 4^ o annually 1957-62, 
employment about -2%), and because only raising total investment dramat-
ically could significantly ease the strain of its distribution among the 
three countries. It is essential to set the second objective because 
Kenya has moved well ahead of her two parteners in the common market 
(4S% of manufacturing employment in 1962, 61% of gross product in manu-
facturing, and 77% of interterritrrial exports of non-food manufactures), 
and because separate national efforts to influence the location of indus-
trial investment are the most serious threat to continuation of even 
the present degree of economic cooperation in East Africa. 
4. . Six possible instruments of industrialization policy can be use-
fully distinguished: 
Book 
Number 
a. Promotion and persuasion. Each national government 
is already engaged in investigating possible in-
dustrial projants., publicizing promising possibi-
lities to both foreign and domestic firms, and 
exerting whatever powers of persuasion or pressure 
it possesses to encourage industrial investment. 
The effectiveness of this instrument should not 
be underestimated, and it is desirable, as well 
as inevitable, that it will continue to be used. 
-This paper is for discussion on3y, not for quotation or 
•publicatd on-. 
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Facilities and services. Each government also under-
takes various activities designed to provide inputs, 
lower costs, or diminish uncertainties for new indus-
trial projects, and thus to- raise their expected pro-
. fitability to private firms. Among such activities 
are preparation of industrial' sites, lending, 
instituti oris-, providing finance at below-market 
rates, and for foreign firtms, defined policies 
about repatriation of profits and capital. 
Again this instrument is important, and is bound, 
to be continued. ... 
c. Public •. enterprises. The Uganda Development Cor-
poration has played a leading entrepreneurial role 
in Uganda industry, and Tanganyika and Kenya have 
recently formed similar organizations, though their 
relative emphasis on indirect provision of finance 
or on direct management of public enterprises is 
not yet clear. Public enterprises can accelerate 
industrialization either by accepting greater risks 
in pioneering new branches of industry, or by accept-
ing lower rates of financial profit in branches of 
industry which are especially stimulating, to the rest 
of the economy. It seems likely and desirable that 
public enterprises, if, managed energetically and non-
politically, will become a much more important instru-
ment in the future in East Africa. Public enter-
prises appear particularly useful for the exercise 
of initiative by the three national governments. 
d. Business tax credits. At present the key features 
of income taxation on public companies are a tax rate 
of 7/50 in the pound (37^), of which Shs.4/- in 
the pound on dividends (209?) is deductible by share-
holders from individual income tax, and investment 
allowances for industrial buildings and equipment 
permitting 120^ of cost to -be written off over their 
useful lives. Tax provisions are traditionally kept 
uniform by consultation among the three finance ministers, 
but if a serious disagreement should arise in the 
future about industrialization policy, one country 
might well set its rates independently. Tax holidays 
for new enterprises have been discussed in the past, 
and the. IBRD mission to Uganda recommended a part-
icular formula. The offcial government positions 
up till now, however, have been that all tax benefits 
should apply to existing as well as new enterprises, 
that a generally favorable tax climate is the most 
important inducement, and that the present tax system 
provides adequate stimulus for industrial investment. 
I shall discuss below why I feel that much more 
should be done with business tax credits. 
e. Protection. Customs duties are already used rather 
energetically to protect domestic industries. There 
is a fairly general rate..of 33-3"^  and valorem .for 
products considered desirable to protect, and higher 
ad valorem or specific rates may be introduced in 
particular cases. Again duties are traditionally 
kept uniform •. by consultation among the three finance 
ministers. Indeed customs duties must be substantial-
ly uniform to prevent duty-avoiding transshipment 
between the members of the common market, and hence 
differential customs duties cannot be used directly 
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to influence location of industrial investment. 
Individual governments can and do raise the 
effective' protection indirectly, however, "by 
granting customs drawbacks to domestic producers 
for duties on imported materials or other inputs, 
and any policy differences about these drawbacks 
could influence location. 
f. Licensing. Domestic producers of certain scheduled 
manufactured products can be granted licenses by 
the EACSO. Ministerial Committee on Commercial and 
Industrial Coordination giving some protection 
against the establishment of domestic competition 
during the term of the license. However, the number 
•of scheduled products is small, none having been 
added since 1955, competition has subsequently 
been permitted in some scheduled products, and the 
administrative process has often ended-' in deadlock 
among the three governments. ' ^ he three IBRD 
missions to Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya successive-
ly recommended that licensing "be abandoned as ineffect-. 
ive and negative. Certainly under present conditions 
it is difficult to employ licensing to influence 
industrial location. An applicant who believes that 
investment will be more profitable in one of the 
three countries, but who Is offered a license only 
if he locates in another, may either go ahead without 
a license or not invest at all; in the meantime 
tensions are created among the three governments, 
and uncertainty about the eventual outcome delays 
the investment. Some change in present licensing 
policy seems clearly needed, whether to eliminate 
it or to expand it. 
5.. The principal next step in industrialisation policy 
should be to establish an East African agency to administer 
the last three instruments-business tax credits, protection, 
and licensing-according to agreed standards. The agreed 
standards should aim at the twin objectives of raising the 
.total rate of industrial investment and ensuring approximate-
ly equal distribution of future benefits among Kenya, Uganda, 
and Tanganyika, To provide greater stimulus to total 
Investment., . the agency would need in particular much ex-
panded powers to offer business tax credits, as well as 
modified powers of protection and licensing. To ensure 
approximately equal distribution of future benefits, the 
agency would need to "be authorized to provide supplementary 
inducements for investment in a lagging country, whenever 
its share of future benefits fell be low a certain minimum, 
(see paragraph 8). The essential features of the suggested 
East African agency are that it be established by an inter-
governmental agreement defining Its powers and standards, 
including the key proviso about sharing future benefits, 
and that it have considerable scope for executive initiative. 
Other features would cf course have to be worked out in 
negotiations: 'it's name (East African Industrialization 
Agency?), its relationship to EACSO (a staff agency report-
ing to the Ministerial Committee on Commercial and Industrial 
Coordination, functioning without the rule of unanimity?), 
its relationship to a future political federation (to be 
absorbed by a Federal Ministry of Industry?), and its inter-
nal organization (a single executive secretary, with three 
deputies seconded from national ministeries?). Thus the 
agency would :be the agent of the three governments in 
carrying out their agreed industrialization policy, using 
the three instruments placed at its disposal. The national 
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governments would continue to employ the first three instruments 
listed above—-promotion and persuasion, facilities and services, 
and public enterprises. They would of course also be the 
ultimate judges of whether the agency was performing satisfact-
orily. 
6. The major expanded power which the agency should have as 
an instrument of industrialization policy is business tax 
credits. Key features of this instrument should be the 
following : 
a. A combination of higher tax rates and larger tax 
credits. The object should not be, as at present, 
to offer moderate tax rates on all business profits 
however earned, but to combine higher taxes on static 
firms which are contributing comparatively little to 
East African industrialization, with lower taxes on 
new and expanding firms which are contributing com-
paratively much. Higher basic tax rates are ne-eded 
in recognition of pressing demands for general govern-
ment revenue for development, and to permit a signif-
icant tax differential between comparatively static 
and comparatively dynamic firms. The actual basic tax 
rates are a detail which would have to be settled 
within the finance ministries, but a rate of Shs.10/-
in the pound (50%), without any corresponding deduction 
for shareholders against individual income tax, may 
serve to illustrate the idea. Larger tax credits are 
needed as the means to grant lower effective taxes 
to new and expanding firms, both to permit greater 
reinvestment of present profits and to raise the pro-
fitability of continuing investment of new capital. 
New firms need assistance particularly bccause of 
their star-ting-up problems; expanding firms, bccause 
of their growing capital requirements. The under-
lying argument is that if some firms are comparatively 
static, they might as well contribute substantially 
to the government's general revenue needs. On the . 
other hand, if other firms are comparatively dynamic, 
the government's development objectives are well 
served by granting lower effective taxes on conditions 
that their profits are used for continuing expansion. 
Moreover., in East African conditions., it seems part-
icularly desirable to have a common business tax policy, 
to avoid the risk of competitive tax inducements by 
three separate governments. 
b. A form of tax holiday for establishments producing, 
new manufactured products. This tax credit should be 
available for new firms, both domestic and foreign, 
and for separable.- new establishments of existing firms. 
My preference would be to extend the tax holiday to 
all new manufactured products; the agency might exclude 
some new products on welfare or luxury grounds, but 
the widest possible scopc would maximize the develop-
ment stimulus. The principal advantage of a form of 
tax holiday^ rather than an investment allowance, is 
that it would not give special tax encouragement ' 
to introducing capital-intensive rather than labour-
intensive processes. The decline of manufacturing 
employment in East Africa in the last five years 
poses a serious social problem, and a substantial 
future rate of increase of manufacturing- employment 
is essential to reap the benefits of industrialization. 
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The employment problem has of course many other 
aspects, but business tax policy can at least 
seek to contribute to its solution. Various 
forms of tax holiday are possible. -The IBRD mission 
to Uganda suggested full tax exemption for any five 
of the first eight years of a new enterprise,* India 
limits the exemption to fewer years and to a certain 
percentage of the invested capital. A form which 
appears attractive to me would be full tax exemption 
for the first three years, two-thirds exemption for 
the next three, and one-third exemption for the 
next three. The agency would also have to establish 
administrative criteria for defining new manufactured 
products and separable new establishments of existing 
firms, which I assume ingenuity can invent. 
c. A formula for tax credits for existing manufacturing 
firms which expand at an above-average rate. It 
is desirable that business tax policy stimulate all 
forms of industrial investment as equally as possible. 
Since much of the. total investment is bound to be 
undertaken by existing firms, both domestic and foreign, 
and since only part of it can take the form of separable 
establishments introducing new products, a formula for 
further tax credits as an alternative to the"tax 
holiday should be designed. Again it is preferable 
to use another device than an investment allowance, 
so as not to give special tax encouragement to re-
placing labour with neir equipment® A formula which 
appears attractive to me Yfould be a percentage credit 
against tax equal to some multiple (say,2) of the 
firm's percentage increase in employment over a recent 
base (say, the average of the preceding" three years). 
With these particular figures a continuing expansion 
of employment at 8-9^5 per year would give a one-third 
credit, 16-17^- would give two-thirds credit, and about 
. 25% would give full tax exemption; the actual figures 
could be set at whatever levels are judged roughly 
comparable to the benefits of the tax holiday, Tyxa'g-..; 
the tax credit to expansion of a firm's labour force 
would at least dramatize the social importance of 
rising employment, and at most might stimulate use 
of more labour-intensive processes. Again administra-
tive details would have to be work out, and alterna-
tive formulas tied to expanding output or expanding 
gross product might be considered. But the key point 
is to provide a tax credit which would discriminate 
significantly between an expanding and a static 
existing firm. 
d. A provision that if industrial investment in one of 
the three countries lagged excessively (see para-
graph 8)r larger tax credits would beoffered to both 
new and existing firms in the lagging country. 
This provision seems to me much more promising than 
licensing as a means of influencing industrial 
location, since it would directly raise the profitab-
ility of Investmnnt in the lagging country, offsett-
ing the other locational. considerations which have 
caused the lag. It also has the advantage that it 
would affect mbst those projects for which the other' 
locational considerations were least significant. 
The -appropriate magnitude of the enlarged tax credits 
is a matter of judgment, and might well be left to 
the discretion of the industrialization agency, 
within some agreed limit (say, doubling the standard 
credits). 
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7. The.agency should also have modified powers to use the 
instruments of protection and licensing to stimulate total 
industrial investment and if necessary influence its geograph-
ical location. 
a. Protection might he used much as at present, "but it 
would be convenient and would reduce potential 
tensions to make the customs duties and any customs 
drawbacks completely uniform for all three countries. 
Actually there would be advantages in eliminating 
drawbacks entirely, except for exports, so that 
domestic consumers would continue to be taxed on 
imported materials even when import replacement 
occurred, and so that evaluation of requests for 
- protection would be focused on the full customs duty 
required to permit an increase in domestic value 
added. The main point, however, is that the agency 
should be authorized to use protection energetically 
on a uniform basis to raise industrial investment in 
East Africa 3-S 3. whole. In a few cases it could also 
grant exceptional duties, if tax credits were insuf-
ficient, to induce location in a country where industrial-
ization had lagged. 
b. Licensing should also be available as an instrument 
which the agency could use at its discretion. In 
industries in which the minimum plant size is large 
relative to the entire East African market, some 
assurance of protection from new domestic competitors 
for a limited time could be a critical factor in 
inducing investment. To make licensing available for 
use, however,- it would be essential that the range of 
products potentially eligible for licenses be radically 
extended, preferably to cover all manufactured products, 
or at least to cover a considerable list of products 
not now produced in East Africa which'might be introduc-
ed in the next deSade or so. At the same time, I pre-
sume that it would not be necessary to use licensing 
in addition to tax credits and protection, in more 
than a limited number of cases. Licensing is an in-
ferior instrument in general, because of its restrict-
ive effect on subsequent investment, and should be 
used simply as a third choice in particular cases. 
8. An important technical question which I have not yet 
discussed is how to measure the share of industrialization 
benefits being received by each of the three countries, so as 
to determine whether .tlte agejacy- is. callle<L ujion —to ..providd 
supplementary inducements for investment in a particular 
country. It se.ems to me that the final decision that a country's 
share has fallen below the acceptable minimum must involve the 
exercise of discretion by the- agcncy, and on this key issue with 
the approval of (two of?) the governments. The .agency should 
keep track continually of three main measures - each country's 
share of additional manufacturing employment, its share of 
additional gross product in manufacturing, and its share of 
gross capital formation excluding residential construction 
and agricultural investment. It seems to me preferable not 
to attempt to measure such effccts as induced demand for inter-
territorial exports or revenue transfers through the fiscal • 
system, since the commonly accepted objective is rough equal-
ity of the direct benefits of industrial activity. The measures 
would have to be examined oyer several years (say, an average 
of the past two years. compared to an average of the previous 
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two), "but with the aim of reaching decisions as expeditiously 
as the evidence permits. In the nature of things no exact 
minimum share of industrialization benefits can be stated, 
but to illustrate the objective the agency might be direct-
ed to take remedial action whenever one country's share 
fell to approximately a quarter. 
9. Two further features seem desirable to complement the 
central powers and responsibilities of the industrializa-
tion agency. 
a. The agency should have a small planning unit study-
ing industrial prospects and possibilities In 
East Africa as a whole, and working closely with 
the national planning organisations in the three 
countries. Its objectives would be to assist in 
maintaining close staff contact among the three 
governments in industrial planning, perhaps by 
regular monthly meetings, and to exercise initiative 
in planning industrialization on an East African 
basis. If and when full federation was achieved 
this planning unit could provide the core of a 
federal..planning office. 
b. The present arrangements for the distributable 
pool should be modified so that all the revenue 
from the income tax on manufacturing firms, rather 
than the present 405?, flowed into the pool. This 
would mean that if supplementary business tax credits 
had to be granted for investment in one of the 
countries, the revenue cost would be borne by all 
three, in recognition of their common interest in 
an effective East African industrialization policy, 
10. The suggestions raised in this brief paper are of 
course no panacea for problems of economic cooperation in 
East Africa. Next steps may also be possible and highly 
desirable in other fields - establishment of a central 
bank, perhaps joint marketing organizations for certain 
major crops, perhaps a common road authority for inter-
teritorial trunk roads. But it seems to be widely recogniz-
ed that significant actions in the field of industrial 
development are critical. The specific ideas raised here, 
as a stimulus for further thought, are at least construct-
ive. and economically feasible. 
